

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 TOKYO 9304

FOR S/P - WINSTON LORD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR JA

SUBJ: BILATERAL PLANNING TALKS

REF: TOKYO 9171

FOLLOWING IS THE PAPER ON SECURITY IN ASIA. THIS PAPER REPRESENTS THE PERSONAL VIEW OF A MEMBER OF THE RESEARCH AND PLANNING DEPARTMENT, AND HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY CLEARED WITHIN THE MINISTRY.

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I. OVERALL SITUATION

ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN NO BASIC CHANGES IN THE ASIAN SITUATION SINCE LATE LAST YEAR, THE FOLLOWING EVENTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE CALL FOR ATTENTION WITH REGARD TO THEIR IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACTS.

...CHINESE MILITARY MOVES AGAINST THE PARACEL ISLANDS

...INDIA'S NUCLEAR TEST

...HEIGHTENED ANTI-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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...ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN

MALAYSIA AND CHINA

...INTENSIFIED ANTAGONISM BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

...THE QUESTION OF OIL PRICES AND SUPPLY

II. THE KOREAN PENINSULA

1. GENERAL SITUATION

(1) CHANGING ASPECTS

(A) TENSION HAS MOUNTED IN THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, E.G., MILITARY INCIDENTS BETWEEN NORTH (DPRK) AND SOUTH KOREA (ROK), CHANGES IN THE FORCES DEPLOYMENT OF THE DPRK, APPARENTLY INTENSIFIED CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE ROK BY THE DPRK.

(B) THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE DPRK HAS BEEN ENHANCED BY ITS ADMISSION TO THE WHO AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING THE ROK.

(C) THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE SITUATION IN THE PENINSULA MAY FURTHER BE COMPLICATED BY THE RECENT FRICTIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE ROK.

(D) THE ROK'S ECONOMY HAS SHOWN A PLANSIBLE PERFORMANCE AND IT APPEARS TO BE A LITTLE BETTER THAN DPRK'S.

(2) ASPECTS WHICH HAVE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED

(A) THE OVERALL MILITARY BALANCE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH REINFORCED BY THE U.S. FORCES.

(B) THE MUTUAL DISTRUST BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH CONTINUES TO EXIST.

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(C) THERE STILL EXIST FEAR ON THE PART OF THE SOUTH OF THE POSSIBLE ATTACK BY THE NORTH AGAINST THE STRATEICALLY VULNERABLE CAPITAL OF SEOUL.

(D) THERE IS PERSISTENT APPREHENSION ON THE PART OF THE SOUTH CONCERNING THE FUTURE CURTAILMENT OF THE U.S. FORCES OR U.S. COMMITMENT.

(E) THERE IS LITTLE PROGRESS MADE IN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE ROK AND THE SOVIET UNION AND EAST EUROPE.

(F) THE LONG TERM OBJECTIVE OF THE DPRK REMAIN UN-CHANGED INCLUDING ITS STANCE OF "INDEPENDENT" LINE AND THE POLICY OF EQUIDISTANCE VIS-A-VIS CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION.

2. PROSPECT

(A) THE ROK SHOULD BE BLE TO MAINTAIN A HIGHER ECONOMIC GROWTH THAN THE DPRK. THE POLITICAL STABILITY OF THE PARK REGIME WILL BE MAINTAINED AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

(B) BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WILL TRY TO MAINTAIN APPARENT POSTURE TO CONTINUE THEIR TALKS AT LEAST UNTIL THE COMING SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THOUGH NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IS ENVISAGED. THE DIFFICULTY IN MAKING ANY SIGNIFICANT PRORRESS IN THE NORTH-SOUTH TALKS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE AFTER THE U.N. SISSION.

(C) IT IS POSSIBLE, IF NOT PROBABLE, THAT INCIDENTS ON A LARGER SCALE THAN THE PAST ONES MAY HAPPEN BETWEEN THE ROK AND THE DPRK. BUT IF SUCH INCIDENTS WERE TO HAPPEN, BIGGER POWERS MAY FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO INTERVENE DIRECTLY BECAUSE OF THE CLIMATE OF DETENTE, WHILE SOVIETS AND CHINA MAY BE MORE SUSCEPTIVE TO THE DPRK'S REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE.

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(D) NO FUNDAMENTAL OR SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IS EXPECTED IN JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE ROK AND THE DPRK RESPECTIVELY FOR SOME TIME TO COME, ALTHOUGH JAPAN WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT ITS BASIC POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH THE ROK DUE TO THE PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR RECENTLY TAKEN BY THE PARK REGIME.

(E) UNCERTAINTIES EXIST WITH REGARD TO THE PROSPECT OF WHAT POSTURE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE IN 1976 AND ONWARD TOWARD THE PENINSULA.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 TOKYO 9304

3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

(1) OBJECTIVE

JAPAN WILL CONTINUE TO HELP THE STABILIZATION OF THE PENINSULA WITHIN ITS OWN CAPACITY AND TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES WHERE NEED ARISES; WHILE JAPAN CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ITS BASIC POLICY OF DEVELOPING FRIENDLY COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE ROK, JAPAN WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE GRANDUALLY EXCHANGES IN THE NON-POLITICAL FIELDS WITH THE DPRK.

(2) SOME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS

(A) AS SOME FRICTIONS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO EMERGE OUT OF THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROK-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP, THE PRIMARY REQUISITE IS TO CONTAIN ITS INCIDENCE TO THE MINIMUM SO THAT IT WILL NOT UPSET THE STATUS OF THE ROK IN ITS OVERALL BALANCE WITH THE DPRK. (DETERIORATION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE ROK COULD BRING ABOUT PRESSURE IN JAPAN TO PROMOTE OR ACCELERATE JAPAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DPRK, THOUGH ITS IMPACT UPON JAPANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS MAY BE LESS INTENSIVE THAN IN THE CASE OF CHINA PROBLEM.)

(B) IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, DEPENDING ON WHAT MOVES
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THE ROK GOVERNMENT MAY TAKE, THERE MAY ARISE A STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO THE PROMOTION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE ROK TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT IT MAY HAMPER THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FROM ACCORDING SUCH A POSITIVE SUPPORT TO THE ROK GOVERNMENT IN SUCH AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM AS THE U.N. THAT IT HAS DONE IN THE PAST, ALTHOUGH JAPAN'S ECONOMIC COOPERATION (GOVERNMENT LEVEL) WITH THE ROK MAY BE CONTINUED AT A MODEST LEVEL.

(C) THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE U.S. FORCES AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE ROK FOR SOME TIME TO COME (FOR NOT ONLY MILITARY BUT ALSO POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS).

(D) IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT BOTH JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO KEEP CLOSE CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER ON THEIR POLICIES TOWARD THE PENINSULA INCLUDING THE KOREAN QUESTION IN THE U.S.

(E) JAPAN AND THE U.S. SHOULD MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACTS TO STUDY POSSIBLE OPTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE PENINSULA, PARTICULARLY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ABOLITION OF THE U.N. COMMAND AND THE CEASE FIRE ARRANGEMENT AND/OR THAT OF THE ADMISSION TO THE U.N. OF BOTH THE ROK AND THE DPRK. BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHOULD COOPERATE TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF STATUS QUO ON THE PENINSULA, PREFERABLY UNDER SOME ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE (E.G. THE STATIONING OF U.N. OBSERVATION FORCES ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE DMZ LINE), WITH A VIEW TO COPING WITH THE SITUATION WHERE THE U.N. COMMAND WOULD BE ABOLISHED.

III. SOUTHEAST ASIA (INDOCHINA, ASEAN AND BURMA)

A. GENERAL SITUATION

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1. INDOCHINA

(1) IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHEN REAL PEACE WILL COME TO VIETNAM, BUT THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PARIS ACCORD IS STILL VIABLE, AND A MAJOR OFFENSIVE OF NORTH VIETNAM IS APPARENTLY

NOT EXPECTED FOR THE TIME BEING. HENCE, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE STATUS QUO WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

(2) THE OVERALL SITUATION IN ONDOCHINA REMAINS FLUID AND DEFIANT OF PREDICTION, BUT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE OVER THE ENTIRE INDOCHINESE REGION MAY BE STRENGTHENED GRADUALLY OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. IN THIS CONNECTION, ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID AS TO HOW NATIONALISM IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA MAY REACT TO SUCH INCREASED NORTH VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE.

(3) CHINA'S MOVES MAY HAVE STRONGER INFLUENCE THAN SOVIET'S INFLUENCE IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THIS AREA. CHINA APPEARS TO BE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF DOMINATING NORTH VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE IN THIS REGION AND ALSO CAUTIOUS SO AS NOT TO TAKE ANY OVERT ACTIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBLE REPULSIVE REACTION OF THE LOCAL COUNTRIES AGAINST SUCH PRESSURE FROM THE GREATER POWERS.

2. ASEAN REGION

(1) THE RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY AND PERSISTENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE REGION CONSTITUTE POTENTIAL AND INHERENT FACTORS OF TENSION WHICH HAVE NOT AS YET RISEN TO THE SURFACE TO SUCH AN EXTENT AS TO INDUCE INTERFERENCE BY BIGGER POWERS. THE PRESENT AND IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS HOW TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL UNREST INCLUDING SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS INVOLVING THE ABOVE MENTIONED FACTORS. HENCE, IT IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO STRENGTHEN THE RESILIENCE OF THESE NATIONS ON A REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVEL, IN ORDER TO ENSURE SECURITY IN THE REGION.

(2) THE CONCEPT OF AN ASEAN NEUTRALIZATION, WHILE IT IS NOT CLEARLY DEFINED, SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS A MANIFESTATION OF THE GENERAL DESIRE OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES TO STRENGTHEN THEIR SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION AND TO CONSOLIDATE THE FOUNDATION OF

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THEIR OWN SELF-DETERMINATION FREE FROM THE INTERFERENCE BY BIGGER POWERS.

3. BURMA

A 'SECRET WAR' IN BURMA INVOLVING THE BURMESE COMMUNISTS IS NOT EXPECTED TO DEVELOP INTO LARGE-SCALE DOMESTIC TURMOIL FOR THE TIME BEING. WHILE IT IS CERTAIN THAT CHINA IS INVOLVED IN THE BACKGROUND HERE, CHINESE INTENTIONS ARE NOT QUITE CLEAR.

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B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

1. IN THIS PERIOD OF INCIPIENT DETENTE AND A FLUID SITUATION IN ASIA, WITH THE ABSNCE OF A COMMON IDENTIFIED CAUSE FOR SECURITY AMONG ASIAN STATES AS WELL AS THEIR VARIOUS INTERNAL ELEMENTS OF INSTABILITY, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PRESENT GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY (ESPECIALLY THE U.S. PRESENCE, MILITARY OR NON-MILITARY) BE MAINTAINED IN ORDER NOT TO UPSET THE DELICATE AND FLUID SITUATION. THE CONTINUED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL AND THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION BY THE U.S. AND JAPAN WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS THE STABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION, MILITARILY POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY. THE CLOSE FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S. ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO THE ASIAN STABILITY. THUS IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES COORDINATE THEIR ASIAN POLICIES FOR COMMON INTERESTS THROUGH CONSTANT DIALOGUE.

2. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO FOSTER A FEELING OF SOLIDARITY OR PARTNERSHIP AMONG ASIAN COUNTRIES ESPECIALLY ON THE QUESTION OF LONG-TERM SECURITY IN THE AREA. IN THIS CONTEXT, MOVES TO PROMOTE REGIONAL COOPERATION AMONG ASEAN COUNTRIES ARE WELCOMED AS AN INITIAL STEP TOWARD THIS DIRECTION, AND THE ELEMENT OF A "REGIONAL NATIONALISM" CONTAINED IN THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD WITH SYMPATHY WITH THE HOPE THAT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE NATIONS CONCERNED WOULD EVOLVE TOWARD A SOUND AND REALISTIC DIRECTION.

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3. THE OIL CRISIS INTRODUCED A NEW ELEMENT TO ASIA. SOME COUNTRIES OF THE REGION FALL UNDER THE CATEGORY OF MSAC WITH CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, OIL PRODUCERS, PARTICULARLY INDONESIA, WOULD DERIVE CONSIDERABLE BENEFITS AND MAY PLAY A LEADING ROLE AMONG THE ASEAN COUNTRIES, WHILE ELEMENTS OF DOMESTIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTABILITY MAY BE INTENSIFIED. THUS A NEW PHASE OF INSTABILITY, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, HAS BEEN INTRODUCED BOTH FOR OIL-RICH AND MSAC COUNTRIES. THEREFORE, THE U.S. AND JAPAN SHOULD INTENSIFY THIS EFFORTS TO COORDINATE THEIR POLICIES TOWARD ASIA, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALSO THE FEELING OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE DIRECTED AGAINST OUTSIDE POWERS LIKE JAPAN AND, IN A LESSER DEGREE, THE U.S.

IV. INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT

1. GENERAL SITUATION

(1) THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST HAS PROVOKED PAKISTAN AND REVERSED THE TREND TOWARD THE RELAXATION OF TENSION ON THE SUB-CONTINENT. THE TEST HAS ALSO WIDER INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS; E.G., IT MAY TRIGGER THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND OBSCURE THE PROSPECT OF IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP.

(2) THE SOVIET NAVY BUILD-UP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN SEEMS, AT THIS MOMENT, TO BE DESIGNED FOR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEMONSTRATION RATHER THAN PURELY MILITARY PURPOSE. U.S. MOVES TO INCREASE ITS PRESENCE INCLUDING THE PLAN OF EXPANDING ITS BASE AT DIEGO GARCIA ARE APPRECIATED AS A COUNTER-BALANCE TO THE SOVIET NAVY BUILD-UP IN AND AROUND THE AREA. CAUTION SHOULD BE TAKEN, HOWEVER, TO AVOID UNNECESSARY ESCALATION OF THE U.S.- SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WHICH MAY PROVOKE THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE AREA.

2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

(1) IT IS DESIRABLE THAT STABILITY BE RESTORED ON THE SUB-CONTINENT AND THAT INDIA TAKE A SOUND STANCE OF NON-ALIGNMENT.

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FOR SUCH PURPOSE, JAPAN MAY MAKE A LIMITED CONTRIBUTION THROUGH MAINTAINING A STANCE EQUIDISTANT TO BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN, AVOIDING INVOLVEMENT

IN THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THESE TWO NATIONS, AND
EXTENDING ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATIONS AT
AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL, AS A MEMBER OF THE CONSORTIUM.

(THE INDIA'S NUCLEAR TEST HAS CREATED SOME
DIFFICULTIES FOR JAPAN'S ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM AND
THE LEVEL OF ITS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR THIS FISCAL
YEAR HAS BEEN DECIDED TO BE KEPT AT THE SAME LEVEL AS
FOR LAST YEAR).

(2) WITH REGARD TO A DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN
AS A ZONE OF PEACE, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS IN
PRINCIPLE IN FAVOUR OF THE IDEA BUT CONSIDERS THAT
THERE ARE A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFICULTIES FOR ITS
REALIZATION.

UNQUOTE.
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